ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) terrorists detonated an IED that destroyed three 330KVA high‑tension electricity transmission towers between Auno and Jakana along the Maiduguri‑Damaturu highway in Borno State. The attack caused a blackout in parts of Borno and Yobe states. Later that morning, at around 8:00 am, a joint Rapid Response Squad (RRS) patrol comprising personnel from the Mobile Police, NSCDC, DSS, NDLEA, Immigration, Hunters, and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) arrived at the scene to assess the damage and provide security for Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) assets. During the inspection, NSCDC officer Abubakar Nurudeen – who had recently been posted to the RRS from the Public Relations Unit – stepped on a hidden IED that had been planted by the terrorists. According to eyewitness accounts, he alerted his colleagues to move back and lifted his leg, at which point the device detonated instantly, inflicting fatal injuries. He was rushed to the state specialist hospital where his death was confirmed. His body was later buried according to Islamic rites.

Perpetrators

ISWAP

Response

The NSCDC Rapid Response Squad (RRS) patrol arrived at the scene following the tower destruction. After the IED explosion, the NSCDC team evacuated Nurudeen’s remains to the state specialist hospital. Commandant Farouk (NSCDC Borno State Command), the Commissioner of Police, the Director‑General of the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Garrison Commander of the 7 Division Nigerian Army visited the crime scene and were briefed by the Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. The Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) issued a statement confirming the destruction of the three towers and the death of the NSCDC officer. TCN condemned the incident and commiserated with the family of the deceased and the NSCDC.

Displacement

0

Socioeconomic drivers

The attack had a clear dual purpose: 1) to destroy critical national infrastructure (electricity transmission towers), causing widespread power outages and economic disruption; and 2) to inflict casualties on security forces responding to the scene through a secondary IED. This secondary device tactic is a well‑documented insurgent strategy designed to maximize casualties and psychological impact.

Trajectory

This incident reflects ISWAP’s continued use of IEDs to target critical infrastructure, a tactic that has been employed multiple times in the Lake Chad region. The use of a secondary device to target first responders represents an evolution in the group’s operational methods, designed to inflict casualties beyond the initial infrastructure strike.

Cycle notes

This incident mirrored earlier ISWAP and Boko Haram attacks combining infrastructure sabotage with secondary IED strikes targeting responders, including the 2015–2017 Maiduguri–Damaturu highway IED campaign, where roadside explosives targeted both civilian movement and military patrols; the 15 November 2016 Bita–Piridang ambush, which combined an initial blast with follow-on engagement; the 02 December 2017 Biu market double-blast, where a secondary device targeted responders after an initial explosion; the 05 August 2017 Lake Chad “double-tap” attacks, where initial violence drew in rescuers before follow-up strikes; and the 2020–2022 repeated attacks on power infrastructure and telecom installations across Borno and Yobe, collectively reflecting a recurring pattern in which insurgents deploy layered IED tactics—initial strikes on strategic assets followed by secondary devices aimed at first responders—to maximize disruption, casualties, and psychological impact.

Pattern

Attack on the security force & infrastructural sabotage

Source

• https://saharareporters.com/2023/12/28/islamic-terrorists-iswap-blow-another-transmission-tower-along-maiduguri-damaturu